Symbolic power and the reception of Chinese narratives on the China–Pakistan economic corridor: adaptation and contestation
Authors
Davide Giacomo Zoppolato & Filippo Boni
Journal
Eurasian Geography and Economics
Published
2025-12-20
Keywords
Symbolic power
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Belt and Road Initiative
multi-scalar analysis
narratives
discourse power
China’s rise represents one of the most consequential developments in 21st-century
international relations. As Beijing has taken an increasingly central role on the global stage,
interest across various academic fields has grown to understand China’s international and
domestic politics, as well as its interactions with countries in the Global South (Dunford and
Liu 2019 ; Karrar 2022 ; Roy et al. 2024 ; Summers 2016 ). Over the past decade, observers have
equated all that China has done internationally with the BRI, giving it a sense of coherence
and grand strategy (Clarke 2017 ; Khan 2018 ). However, when examined “from the ground”
(Adeney and Boni 2021 ; Murton and Lord 2020 ; Oliveira et al. 2020 ) the initiative reveals itself
to be much more complex and less organized than it appears (Jones and Hameiri 2021 ;
Mardell 2023 ). In light of the wide-ranging nature of China’s international engagements,
scholars attempted to consolidate such a vast and diverse academic production under the
broader field of “Global China” (Franceschini and Loubere 2022 ). Following Ching Kwan Lee’s
pioneering work which has paved the way for this emerging field (Lee 2018 ), three broad
strands have been identified, namely: Global China as a policy; Global China as method; and
Global China as power. Here, we focus on Global China as “power” examining the dynamics
behind China’s outward expansion: economic statecraft, patron-client ties, and symbolic
domination (Lee 2022 ). While CPEC in many ways encompasses all three of these mechanisms,
with its focus on energy and infrastructural investments (economic statecraft), and the power
asymmetry between Islamabad and Beijing (generating patron-client dynamics in bilateral
relations), our focus is on “symbolic domination,” a dimension central to China’s foreign policy
yet largely overlooked in existing research.
Symbolic power and symbolic domination are often used interchangeably, with a focus on
showing domination rather than exploring how symbolic power creates new paradigms,
establishes new realities, and how it is received and resisted. Symbolic power has a political
function, often described as symbolic violence or domination. In Bourdieu’s words, symbolic
power is one of the “instruments that help ensure one class dominates another by bringing
their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of power which underlie them” (Bourdieu
2009 , 167). However, as we explore in this article, domination is not always the outcome of
symbolic power, and spaces of resistance open up when symbolic power is exercised. Building
on Lee and Bordieu’s work, we contend that symbolic power can be applied to understand
China’s interactions with the outside world.
Symbolic power operates by constructing shared systems of meanings, perceptions, and
categorizations that go beyond simple force or economic power. Bourdieu argues that
symbolic power “is a power of constructing reality” with the capacity to produce a social
system where people accept existing power relations as natural and legitimate (Bourdieu
2009 , 179). To reach this goal, symbolic power relies on structured symbolic systems like
language, art, science, religion, and other ideological superstructures. Symbolic systems play a
fundamental role in maintaining existing power structures as well as in establishing new ones,
as “consensus contributes fundamentally to the reproduction of the social order” (182). For
Bourdieu, symbolic systems serve as the “power to impose (or even to inculcate) the arbitrary
instruments of knowledge and expression (taxonomies) of social reality – but instruments
whose arbitrary nature is not realised as such” (167).
Our analysis focuses on how China’s outward expansion in the Global So\uth relies
significantly on political language to shape norms, perceptions and behaviors, consolidating
its power while also opening spaces of resistance. The multiplicity within symbolic power
means that “linguistic constructions are thus read as being, at the same time, instruments of
communication, political domination, and, potentially, resistance” (Eagleton-Pierce 2013 , 47).
In our examination, we found that there is resistance to symbolic power and to the new worlds
created. This is important because policymaking communities (particularly in the US) often
present a “China threat” narrative (Breslin and Mattlin 2025 ; Rogelja and Tsimonis 2020 ) that
assumes a centrality of power which is unproblematically projected outwards with no
limitations, thereby treating partner countries as passive bystanders in China’s global
expansion.
Our research, along with a growing body of literature on Global China, adopts instead a
relational perspective that examines how power is co-constructed through interactions across
scales between Chinese and Pakistani actors (Boni 2022 AQ6). In doing so, we show that the
BRI is not a one-way street. Instead, it is a complex negotiation process involving acceptance,
resistance, bargaining, and adaptation between Beijing and its partners (Safdar 2025 AQ7;
Abb, Boni, and Karrar 2024 ; Oh 2018 ). In this article, we define symbolic power as the capacity
of a country to propose, legitimize, and naturalize its vision of the social and spatial world and
the principles of its construction upon other nations. In China’s case, symbolic power is
enacted through both discourse and infrastructure: material investments are accompanied by
narratives of modernization and connectivity that seek to naturalize a spatial order, privileging
certain corridors, cities, and regions while bypassing others (Karrar 2022 ). As our analysis
shows, China’s symbolic power is in fact contested and resisted in specific places where
development promises have not translated into local benefits.
In our examination, symbolic power operates through three mechanisms: the establishment of
doxa, misrecognition, and illusio, which largely correspond to the projection (doxa) and
reception (misrecognition and illusio) of China’s narratives. We contend that these
mechanisms are constituted and enacted through spatial practices. China projects doxa from
key nodes and actors like Islamabad and its Embassy, where narratives of connectivity and
cooperation are framed as common sense. Yet misrecognition and illusio unfold unevenly: in
core regions, narratives are more readily internalized; in peripheral places, they are contested
or reworked. This illustrates how symbolic power is mediated through spatial hierarchies and
differentiated place-based experiences. We now turn to the three mechanisms to show how
symbolic power is articulated differently across spatial contexts.
First, doxa refers to the “set of beliefs and viewpoints of the dominant actor that defines a
particular field, and appear natural and commonsensical to others, thereby serving to
underpin power relations between them in a form of an axiomatic consensus” (Vangeli 2018 ,
3). Doxa is constantly evolving and transforming, but even when changes occur it remains
supportive of existing power structures. In the case of China–Pakistan relations, a notable
example is the repeated claim by Pakistani leaders that “CPEC is a game changer.”
Government speeches, media headlines, and policy documents all frame CPEC as the natural,
uncontested, and only path to Pakistan’s modernization. Second, these doxa are then
embedded unconsciously within social processes and life through what is known as
méconnaissance, which makes doxic claims appear natural, universal, and self-evident.
Misrecognition is what makes domination possible and “rests on the bodily inculcation of
social structure and the formation of a deep, unconscious habitus” (Burawoy 2019 , 163). In the
case of CPEC, misrecognition occurs when national media and politicians present Chinese
investments as always beneficial for the country, seldom questioning their long-term
implications or uneven distribution in Pakistan. In this narrative, China is presented as a
selfless development partner, without acknowledging that these investments also advance
China’s own strategic and economic interests in Pakistan, including acquiring long-term stakes
in key sectors such as energy, logistics, and telecommunications. However, misrecognition is
not absolute: not all claims of who holds symbolic power are misrecognized and internalized
as natural. As our analysis of provincial media shows, national elites may misrecognize China’s
power to secure political or financial gains, but provincial actors are more likely to resist or
reject claims that do not reflect local realities or unmet promises.
Third, illusio operates at the level of those who are subject to power rather than those who
wield it. It is a mechanism which fosters adherence to doxa and a willingness to participate in
new worlds and paradigms established by symbolic power (Stahl et al. 2018 ). Illusio is always
cultivated through social processes known as the “search for recognition” where individuals
evaluate themselves based on others (Bourdieu and Nice 1977 , 72). In our case, the Pakistani
government strongly believes, and promotes the belief, that CPEC will bring economic
development and prosperity to the country, motivating it to invest resources and political
efforts into the initiative and to accept China’s doxic claims. This illusio is not only a simple
adherence but entails an emotional commitment (Threadgold 2020 ). Pakistani officials and
national media strongly defend CPEC in public forums, especially in response to external
criticism. For example, as illustrated in our case study when a US diplomat criticized CPEC in
2019 , Pakistani leaders swiftly and vocally condemned the remarks and framed them not as an
attack on CPEC but one on Pakistan’s sovereignty and dignity. Instead of debating the
substance of the critique – debt, transparency, and accountability – government and national
media portrayed the comments as a threat to China-Pakistan and responded with strong
emotional rhetoric. Illusio is a critical mechanism, as emotional commitment enhances the
likelihood of accepting, rather than resisting, new doxa. When there is a preexisting emotional
commitment, doxa are more likely to find fertile ground and be absorbed and reproduced. On
the contrary, weaker emotional commitment leads to resistance, as doxic claims are less likely
to resonate with the target audience. As shown in our analysis, symbolic power is never
absolute and can be resisted especially when it is localized. Thus, resistance can disrupt doxa
or make doxic acceptance more problematic, expose misrecognition, and challenge the illusio
that sustains symbolic power. While a symbolic power seeks to naturalize certain worldviews,
local contexts ensure ongoing contestation of meanings and power relations. To substantiate
these points, the ensuing parts first discuss our methodology and then present the analysis of
both China’s narratives of CPEC and how these narratives are reproduced (if at all) in
Pakistan’s national and local media.
Pakistan was selected as a case study, given the country’s central role within the BRI, and
because CPEC represents one of the most politically and strategically significant components
of China’s overseas development strategy. Islamabad’s leadership was among the first globally
to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with China in the spring of 2013, before Chinese
President Xi Jinping announced the BRI in autumn that same year. Pakistan is also the third
largest recipient of Chinese development finance worldwide, with a portfolio of US$70.
billion, which demonstrates its importance in China’s global outreach (Goodman et al. 2024 ).
Given Pakistan’s political and economic significance in the BRI, it is an ideal case for assessing
the reception of narratives. We focus on news articles for their role in driving public opinion
and delegitimizing contestations to power (McFarlane and Hay 2003 ). News articles also serve
as battlegrounds for geopolitical struggles between major powers, advancing and shaping the
emergence of new narratives (Ciută and Klinke 2010 ; Grydehøj et al. 2021 ). Our methodology
employs a range of quantitative methods – including time series analysis, content analysis,
and sentiment analysis – with discourse analysis to examine the downstream effects of
“discourse power” in CPEC.
Data collection involved three steps: first, gathering news articles published by the news
section of the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad’s website; second, covering country-wise media
representation of CPEC; and third, selecting one provincial newspaper per province. As a
result, we compiled an original dataset divided in two components: the first, aimed at
identifying Chinese narratives of CPEC, composed of 972 articles in Chinese from the news
section of the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad’s website; the second, aimed at studying the
reception of Chinese narratives, which includes 4,316 articles in English from national-level
media outlets and 845 in Urdu from provincial outlets.
Data from the news section of the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad’s website illustrates the
official and diplomatic position of China and contains a list of news articles covering Pakistan–
China relations and major cooperation activities conducted by the embassy and Chinese
actors in the country. For the national perspective in Pakistan, we chose CPEC-Info, a
collaboration between China Radio International – operated by the Propaganda Department
of the Chinese Communist Party – and the Pakistan-China Institute, a Pakistani think tank
promoting ties between Pakistan and China. Being a collaboration between Chinese and
Pakistani actors, we selected CPEC-Info because it represents the official views that the two
countries seek to project about CPEC. CPEC-Info includes a wide range of sources from both
Pakistan and abroad, including: The News, The Nation, PCI, Daily Times, Tribune, Dawn, and
Pakistan Today. To cross-validate the data, given the tendency of CPEC-Info to omit negative
coverage of CPEC, we qualitatively checked the content during the peaks analyzed in two
national newspapers: Dawn and The Express Tribune. We aimed to examine whether and how
they reported negative coverage during peak periods. We provide an account of the coverage
by these two newspapers, along with an analysis of CPEC-Info, in the empirical section. For
provincial newspapers, we selected one Urdu newspaper for each province with the highest
circulation (Audit Bureau of Circulation 2023 ). As a result, our data are from Daily Azadi
Quetta for Balochistan (537 articles), Daily Taqat Lahore for Punjab (143 articles), Awami Awaz
for Sindh (128 articles), and Daily Mashriq for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (37 articles).
Data collection involved writing two Python scripts to automatically gather all newspaper
articles published on the news sections of the Chinese Embassy and by CPEC-Info on their
website, organizing the database with author, source, date and time, summary, and content
details. For the local newspaper, we manually collected articles mentioning CPEC and
organized their content in similar columns. Texts in Urdu were first translated by a native
speaker and then cross-checked using the Google Translate API.
With regards to the data analysis, the first step involved identifying the constituent elements
of China’s narratives. To do so, we first calculated term frequency within the dataset covering
the news section of the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad’s website. We extracted the top 1000
most frequent words and grouped them into five mutually exclusive themes, guided by our
domain knowledge ensuring semantic distinctiveness and the identification of dominant
narrative frames through high-frequency term clustering and manual validation (Neuendorf
2017 ; Vaismoradi et al. 2016 ). This process resulted in the identification of five macro themes:
Benevolent and Responsible Power (including terms such as win–win cooperation, mutual
benefit, and community with a shared future for mankind, projecting China as a cooperative
and responsible global actor); China’s Global Initiatives (referencing China’s strategic
ambitions abroad, with terms like BRI and Global Development Initiative); Resistance
(capturing opposition and contestation, including terms like terrorism, civil unrest, and
protest); Security (emphasizing stability and order, with terms such as security, stability, and
peace); and Socio-Economic Modernization (focusing on development and connectivity, with
terms like infrastructure, investment, electricity, and agriculture).
Using Python, we then processed each dataset to calculate the percentage of articles
containing terms from our manually defined thematic dictionaries. These dictionaries were
developed separately in Chinese (for the Chinese Embassy dataset) and English (for national
and provincial newspapers). We then calculated how often each theme appeared in its
respective dataset and compared thematic engagement across the three media levels: the
Chinese Embassy, Pakistani national newspapers, and provincial newspapers. Our content
analysis allowed us to trace a baseline for identifying narrative convergence or divergence
across scales and informed the selection of case study peaks for qualitative discourse analysis.
Specifically, we focused on how China’s core narratives were echoed, adapted, or resisted
across different sources giving a broad overview.
We then moved to the identification of the peaks within the time series to conduct a
qualitative discourse analysis to reveal variations in how Pakistani media in English and Urdu
depict the CPEC. Thus, we identified sequential time data grouped by year, month, and day to
understand trends and patterns within media coverage. Peaks in the time series were used to
select dates for both national and local media coverage of CPEC for the case study in the next
section. We also examined the sentiment expressed by the articles included in the dataset. To
do so, we use the model “distilbert-base-uncased-finetuned-sst-2-english,” which is a pre-
trained and fine-tuned language model for classifying text as positive or negative. Since our
provincial data were originally in Urdu and then translated into English, we manually reviewed
articles expressing reservations about CPEC to verify that the sentiment model correctly
captured the original tone after translation.
Following this content and sentiment analysis stage, we examined the newspaper coverage
and qualitatively coded the articles. We identified categories and topics to explore the depth
of the CPEC conversation, comparing how different media outlets either shared similar
coverage or diverged in their focus, highlighting the projection of China’s narratives and
varying receptions across scales. We then selected two case studies that exemplify contrasting
CPEC narratives, allowing us to highlight China’s symbolic power and examine misrecognition
and illusio in greater detail. The first case refers to a positive event, celebrating the successful
70th year of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan. The second case examines the
media response to remarks made during a conference by US diplomat Alice Wells, where she
expressed opposition to the CPEC and critiquing it as not beneficial for Pakistan. In both cases,
we also explore how, within the same timeframe identified by the analysis, provincial-level
coverage of CPEC differed significantly. This variation in the reception of China’s narratives
underscores that symbolic power does not permeate all levels or scales with the same
intensity, revealing a disconnect driven by misrecognition on one hand and varying degrees of
emotional investment - illusio - on the other.
Narratives are extensively used to promote China’s role in the international order, often in the
form of political slogans and mottos (Zeng 2020 ). The latter reflect China’s efforts to establish
a new common sense, or doxa, originating from its own perspective and shaping how it wants
to be seen globally. Scholars have studied these slogans extensively, from Mao’s “serve the
people” and “self-reliance” to more recent ones such as “peaceful rise” (Glaser and Medeiros
2007 ), “human community for a shared destiny” (Nathan and Zhang 2022 ), and the “China
dream” (Goldstein 2020 ). These slogans frequently appear in the discourse of Chinese leaders
and media (Garlick and Qin 202 4). Scholars have identified a number of purposes that these
slogans serve: allowing CCP leaders to test new ideas; persuading the international community
that China’s intentions are totally benign and its actions justified; and increasing domestic
legitimacy (Boni 2024 ; Rolland 2020 ). China’s narratives are becoming increasingly spatialized
in the Global South, often tied to infrastructure corridors and strategic geographies where
symbolic power is projected alongside material investments (Alff 2020 ; Liu and Jin 2024 ; Lu
and Dwyer 2023 ; Murton 2024 ; Murton and Tom 2024 ; Woodworth and Joniak-Lüthi 2020 ;
Yeh and Wharton 2018 ).
To reiterate, to track the constituent elements of China’s narratives on CPEC, we examined the
most frequently used terms on the website of the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, and grouped
these terms into five major themes. We then analyzed the extent to which the same themes
are engaged with in Pakistani national and provincial newspapers, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Comparison of China’s narratives in China’s Embassy news and Pakistani
newspapers ( 2015 – 23).
Regarding the first two themes “Benevolent and Responsible Power” and “China’s Global
Initiatives,” China’s Embassy extensively engages with both global development initiatives and
key political slogans. Pakistani national newspapers similarly align with and actively engage
with these themes. Interestingly, in the case of “Benevolent and Responsible Power” the
national media’s alignment with the Embassy demonstrates how China’s symbolic power and
official rhetoric are reproduced, even when these themes have little relevance to Pakistan’s
specific context.
While less prominent, provincial newspapers also reference these themes, indicating that
China’s narratives have diffused across scales, though unevenly. As expected, Pakistani
newspapers devote greater attention to more grounded, CPEC-specific themes. For example,
coverage of “Socio-Economic Modernization” at the national scale not only aligns with but
even surpasses China’s Embassy, emphasizing the positive contribution of China for Pakistan’s
modernization and development. However, this alignment becomes more fragmented at the
subnational level: in provincial newspapers, only 38% of articles focus on this theme.
Our analysis shows that “Security” is another major theme widely covered by the Chinese
Embassy’s website. Articles on this topic often emphasize the need for Pakistan to strengthen
the protection of Chinese citizens, particularly in response to attacks targeting Chinese
individuals in the country. While this theme is also addressed by both national and provincial
newspapers, their engagement with it is less pronounced, again indicating spatial disparities in
China’s narratives salience and resonance.
“Resistance” is the only theme where there is a clear divergence in alignment between
Pakistani newspapers and the Chinese Embassy’s narratives. Unlike other themes, where
national newspapers closely align with the Embassy’s messaging, this theme shows the
opposite dynamic. National newspapers tend to downplay or avoid engaging with resistance-
related topics, whereas provincial newspapers provide detailed coverage of incidents and
opposition to CPEC in Pakistan. This instance shows how there is an attempt at national level
to present a positive narrative of CPEC, which aligns with the interest of both governments to
portray CPEC as aloof from stumbling blocks and opposition. However, local newspapers are
more inclined to discuss the more critical aspects of CPEC, evidencing some of the limits that
symbolic power has when it comes to controlling the narrative. In fact, provincial newspapers
provide place-based accounts of discontent, often rooted – as we see in the two case studies
- on lived experience of exclusion from CPEC developments.
To provide a more comprehensive understanding of how symbolic power works, the ensuing
analysis of the two case studies demonstrates that the reception of narratives is not a one-way
process and even when rhetorical alignment takes place – meaning the media environment
engages and recirculates China’s narratives – these narratives are not accepted in their
entirety. Rather, actors negotiate, interpret, and sometimes challenge the narratives presented.
To evaluate this, we analyze sentiment at national and provincial levels as indicators of how
doxic claims are accepted and the extent to which misrecognition and illusio operate. Positive
sentiments suggest misrecognition or strong investment in doxic claims, while negative
sentiments indicate recognition of power’s arbitrariness or disengagement from the game. To
complement the content analysis presented above, we provide additional evidence of the
macro-trends highlighted here by providing an in-depth, qualitative assessment of the media
coverage of two peaks in our dataset, related to the 70th anniversary of the establishment of
diplomatic ties, and the remarks of a US official on CPEC.
70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations
Our first case study focuses on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the two countries. Celebrations to mark this milestone in bilateral
cooperation started in March 2021 and this was one of the peaks that we have identified in
the data, with a total of 189 articles (145 national/14 local/17 China’s Embassy).
As shown in Figure 2 , during this initial peak, Pakistani media engaged with China’s narratives
by heavily emphasizing “Socio-Economic Modernization.” China’s Embassy dedicated 88.2% of
its articles to this theme, compared to an average of 58%. Interestingly, during this month,
there was no coverage of “Resistance,” and “Security” coverage dropped significantly from the
average of 35.2% to just 11.7%. This suggests that during the month of the celebrations, both
China’s Embassy and Pakistani newspapers were more inclined to focus on socio-economic
modernization. Notably, the two other themes – “China’s Global Initiatives” and “Benevolent
and Responsible Power” - are downplayed pointing out the intention of delivering concrete
benefits to Pakistan during the celebrations.
Figure 2. Comparison of China’s narratives in embassy news and Pakistani newspapers
(March 2021).
At the national level, 21 out of the total 145 articles are dedicated to the 70th anniversary of
the establishment of diplomatic relations celebrations. They include pieces largely reflecting
the bonhomie between the two sides, including the launching of a “Pakistan-China literary
corridor,” the opening of a web portal to promote Chinese travel to Pakistan, and the
announcement that China was gifting Pakistan 500,000 doses of the coronavirus vaccine as
part of its rollout of vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic (CPEC Info 2021a). In
parallel with the coverage of events celebrating the anniversary of diplomatic relations, the
news extensively covered positive remarks from diplomats and politicians on both sides. The
then Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Nong Rong, during a visit to the Orange Line Metro in
Lahore, a key CPEC project, expressed Beijing’s expectation of an even closer relationship with
Islamabad and wrote about the strengthening cooperation between China and Pakistan (CPEC
Info 2021b).
On the Pakistani side, instead, then Prime Minister Imran Khan celebrated China’s poverty
alleviation efforts, defining them as “nothing short of a miracle” (CPEC Info 2021c). Extending
the analysis to the wider framing of CPEC in March 2021, the media coverage was aimed at
providing a positive picture of the project. To this end, there were a number of articles
focusing on the return of Chinese workers following COVID, on the increasing involvement of
Chinese private firms in CPEC, and on major project advancements, including the
development of the Special Economic Zone in Rashakai, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (CPEC Info
2021d), and the benefits stemming from the Port Qasim (CPEC Info 2021e) and Thar power
plants (CPEC Info 2021f) (both located in Sindh) for Pakistan’s electricity generation efforts.
Among the overwhelmingly positive portrayal of CPEC that could be found at the national
level, in one of the articles covering these relations, we find evidence of how symbolic power
operates through the establishment of a new doxa. This article connects the 70th year’s
celebration with the 100-year establishment of the CCP. Instead of celebrating bilateral
cooperation, it presents a one-sided narrative where Pakistan is portrayed as a simple receiver
of Chinese benevolence. The China-Pakistan Friendship Highway, the highly celebrated
Karakoram Highway as the symbol of China-Pak friendship, is portrayed as a consequence of
China’s will. As the article goes, “One hundred years ago, the CCP instilled the hope of a better
nation and started leading China on the road to stability and development. This then
translated into the China-Pakistan Friendship Highway which aims to closely link the destinies
of China and Pakistan” (CPEC Info 2021g). With regards to CPEC, at the national level there
was a unanimously positive reporting as also observed in our cross-validation sample. In
March 2021, Dawn published articles highlighting strengthened cooperation between China
and Pakistan (Dawn 2021a, Dawn, 2021b) and how Balochistan will greatly benefit from CPEC
(Dawn 2021c). Similarly, the Express Tribune emphasized the gifting of COVID-19 vaccines (The
Express Tribune 2021a) and the important role of the Rashakai SEZ in national economic
development (The Express Tribune 2021b).
This overwhelmingly positive portrayal of CPEC in the national press contrasts with place-
based critiques emerging from the Urdu press at the provincial level, where the depiction
differs. In Balochistan, a strategic location within the CPEC, we found evidence of local spatial
realities disrupting China’s symbolic power. This province, despite being central to the CPEC
due to hosting the deep seaport of Gwadar, has experienced significant resistance and
protests from local people, encompassing both violent and nonviolent actions, and contesting
China’s narratives based on locally situated experiences of exclusion. In the case of
Balochistan, the Daily Azadi has four out of eleven articles expressing reservations about CPEC.
This is the only instance across the four provincial newspapers (with 14 articles) where we find
evidence of concerns regarding CPEC being raised. Among the articles, one referred to the
“acute shortage of teachers in Gwadar’s Ormara, Ganza and Pishukan high and middle
schools” (Azadi 2021a). Another one shed light on the poor living conditions and lack of
access to basic infrastructure. As the article goes:
today in Gwadar, there is no hospital to offer any good treatment to a patient.
People there are yearning for a single drop of water. Electricity is provided only for
one hour after 20/25 days. Water coming through a half inch pipe spreads
diseases. And the old town of Gwadar looks like a ghost area. (Azadi 2021a)
In the case of Balochistan, we can therefore observe the formation of a spatially-grounded
counter-narrative that challenges the vision of development as promoted by the national
level.
This is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. First, Balochistan has a long-standing
history of grievances against the federal government. As an expert on Balochistan noted, “one
of the major grievances of Balochistan has always been that the federal government decides
its fate” (Interview with one of the authors, 2018AQ8). These remarks reflect concerns over the
province’s historical exclusion from decision-making processes and institutions (particularly
the army) and the perceived exploitation of its vast economic resources. CPEC has further
exacerbated these tensions, as provincial inputs in its initial planning and implementation
were minimal (Boni and Adeney 2020 ). Second, despite Balochistan’s strategic importance in
the wider CPEC framework, given that it hosts the Gwadar Port, provincial stakeholders have
frequently expressed dissatisfaction with their limited role in managing the project. The port
remains under federal control and is operated by the China Overseas Ports Holding Company
(COPHC), which, under the terms of the concession agreement, retains 91% of the generated
revenues. This has intensified local frustrations over the perceived marginalization of Baloch
interests in one of the country’s most significant infrastructure initiatives.
Other provincial media outlets, while not contesting the development project as directly as
Balochistan, are also engaging in alternative narratives challenging the single vision of CPEC
as being unconditionally beneficial for Pakistan or by using the initiative for national political
considerations. An example of this discourse can be found in an article from Daily Mashriq, a
newspaper from Peshawar, where the author discusses the agreement signed between Iran
and China. The article casts doubt on the future of the CPEC, suggesting a potential shift in
focus toward Iran’s Chabahar port as an alternative to Gwadar. This illustrates geopolitical
anxieties and fears of being left out of CPEC’s benefits (Mashriq 2021 ). The Daily Awami Awaz,
a Sindhi newspaper, covers Imran Khan’s speech at the 14th virtual summit of the Economic
Cooperation Organization. Khan highlighted the insufficient cooperation with wealthy nations
and called for enhanced global collaboration in the COVID-19 vaccine campaign. Here, even if
the speech only laterally mentions CPEC, the initiative is prominently featured in the title,
serving as a form of clickbait (Awaz 2021 ).
From the multi-scalar analysis of this first case it emerges that the patterns of symbolic power
are largely reproduced at the national level, where there is evidence of Chinese narratives
being absorbed and accepted by media and elites alike. At the national level, in the case of
the 70th-anniversary celebrations of China-Pakistan diplomatic relations, the Pakistani media
environment misrecognized the uneven power relations. This misrecognition operates as a
result of a number of reasons. First, Chinese investments strengthen political legitimacy for the
Pakistani political elites. Through building infrastructure, channeling development funds to
their constituencies, and the extraction of rent, Pakistan’s elites oversold the benefits that
would be accrued from CPEC (Karrar 2024 ). Second, the strong military to military ties
between the two countries (China is Pakistan’s main supplier of military equipment) mean that
the Pakistani establishment has sought to control the media environment around CPEC to
protect a crucial partner when it comes to defense capabilities (Afzal 2020 ). Third, and directly
linked to the previous point, the Sino-Pakistani strategic partnership serves strategic goals,
especially in light of the closer India-US ties and it was therefore imperative to control the
narrative around Chinese investments in Pakistan.
Illusio is also evident in how most media framing pushes an overwhelmingly positive portrayal
of CPEC. Whether it is the Rashakai SEZ, power plants, or the return of Chinese workers after
CPEC disruptions, the Pakistani media landscape appears emotionally invested in promoting
the success of CPEC. The media coverage of CPEC was aimed at emphasizing its continued
success, despite the slowdown and recalibration that were witnessed during those same years.
This framing overlooks potential negative short- and long-term implications, which are, by
contrast, more critically addressed by provincial newspapers. Here, we see how the lack of
emotional commitment toward Chinese projects prevents the mechanism of illusio to fully
operate. As such, we have found some “pockets of resistance” to symbolic power at the local
level. Provincial newspapers show that while symbolic power permeates the national level
discourse, at the local level the reporting covers more critical aspects of CPEC. This also
highlights the importance of taking a multi-scalar approach to understanding symbolic power,
as it allows us to gauge the extent to which narratives penetrate and are absorbed within
partner countries.
CPEC and the US–China rivalry
The second case we analyze revolves around US criticism of CPEC. This is a particularly
interesting example not only for the multi-scalar dynamics that we discuss, but also because it
places Pakistan at the very heart of the wider US–China global competition. One of the peaks
we identified in the media coverage (180 articles in total, with 148 at national, 32 at local level,
and 15 on China’s Embassy’s website) was in November 2019.
As shown in Figure 3 , during this second peak, while the theme of “Socio-economic
Modernization” remains significant in both Chinese and Pakistani newspapers, there is a major
emphasis at the level of China’s Embassy on the themes of “Benevolent and Responsible
Power” (60%) and “China’s Global Initiatives” (66.7%), compared to averages of 32.7% and
37%, respectively. In the context of geopolitical competition between China and the US, the
data reveals increased thematic engagement with these two topics. This can be explained by
China’s perception that US critiques were not directed at Pakistan and CPEC specifically, but
were part of a larger backlash against the BRI. However, CPEC-Info and provincial newspapers
are less engaged with these two themes, covering more the benefits CPEC brought in terms of
socio-economic modernization and, as the following analysis of this peak shows, countering
critiques of CPEC rather than the BRI as a whole.
Figure 3. Comparison of China’s narratives in embassy news and Pakistani newspapers
(November 2019).
The November 2019 peak covers the remarks that Ambassador Alice Wells, then Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia at the US Department of State,
made on CPEC in November 2019. In her speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center, she outlined
the US’s criticism of the way in which CPEC was being financed and implemented.
Highlighting the issues around costs, debts, jobs, and the transparency of Chinese investments
in Pakistan, in her concluding remarks the US’s representative noted how “in contrast to the
Chinese Communist Party, the United States leads a vision for the Indo-Pacific region that is
free and open,” also calling on Pakistanis to “ask Beijing the tough questions and insist on
accountability, fairness and transparency. Ask the Chinese government why it’s pursuing a
development model in Pakistan that significantly deviates from what brought China its own
economic success” (United States Department of State 2019 ).
The speech received extensive attention with both Chinese and Pakistani officials countering
such a critical representation of CPEC and of Sino-Pakistani relations more broadly. Both sides
strongly defended CPEC against what became to be framed as a bad faith position of
Ambassador Wells due to a lack of knowledge and information. (Dawn, 2019a) The former
Chinese Ambassador highlighted how the speech, instead of serving US interests, only “fully
exposes her [Wells] ignorance of Pakistan-China relations.” He also added that “media is a
major vehicle of information and platform of interaction” and that “media from both Pakistan
and China have already been playing a role in promoting state-to-state relations”
(The Express Tribune, 2019aAQ9).
On the Pakistani side, then Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi strongly criticized the US
stance on CPEC, while the government finance adviser Firdous Ashiq Awan, suggested that the
CPEC project will not only pave the way for development for Pakistan and China, but also for
other countries in the region (CPEC Info 2019 ). Our cross-validation sample voices similar
concerns over Well’s remarks, and shows how doxa plays out in this case. An article from
Dawn pointed out how “her speech appeared linked to a major offensive that Washington has
recently launched against Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative” (Dawn 2019b). Along the same
lines, an editorial published in The Express Tribune labeled the US’s position on CPEC as a
“pernicious statement [...] deliberately aimed at stocking Pakistani concerns about CPEC in
particular, and Pakistan-China relations in general” (The Express Tribune 2019b).
The widespread national pushback, anchored in Islamabad and echoed across elite national
media outlets, was also partly mirrored at the provincial level. In Karachi and Quetta in
particular, there were 15 articles covering the US official’s comments. One article from Karachi
reported the resolution passed by the Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs against
the US interference in CPEC. It also noted that the Chinese Ambassador Zhao Jing denied the
American allegations of corruption in CPEC and said that the US Deputy Secretary of State had
made baseless accusations against CPEC (Awaz 2019a). Finally, there was also an article
reporting that Senator Raza Rabbani has said that “the U.S.A. should respect Pakistan’s
economic, political, and regional autonomy and they want to make India the hegemon of the
region against China” (Awaz 2019b).
Pakistani media misrecognized Wells’ remarks. Instead of being treated as potential fair
critiques not directly addressed to Pakistan but rather to CPEC as part of the BRI, the strong
response across different scales, with the exception of Balochistan, led the media landscape to
fail in recognizing the critique on its own terms, which were potentially valid concerns about
increasing debt, lack of transparency, and economic sovereignty, and instead view it as a
political attack through the lens of Pakistan’s broader relationship with China. The emotional
commitment invested in responding with such strong military-like rhetoric -
defending/guarding/protecting – also reveals the illusio that CPEC is the only path to
economic development in the country. In this context illusio works effectively because the
media landscape is deeply invested in promoting CPEC and its “game changer” nature. As a
result, any perceived threat to CPEC is seen as an existential threat to the partnership with
China, reflecting the deep emotional and uneven investment Pakistan has developed in its
relationship with China.
Not all provincial outlets, however, believe in this illusio and/or misrecognize Wells’ remarks.
Similarly to what we have previously observed, the Quetta newspaper voiced some criticism of
CPEC. One article for instance noted that despite CPEC’s importance:
for Balochistan there is not a single rupee allocated in the budget. Which is a
huge injustice to the province. Gwadar port is in Balochistan, and Gwadar offers
export and import facility. But we are being neglected, and this is spreading
deprivation in the province. (Azadi 2019b)
handed over to the National Logistics Cell, a military linked organization (Azadi 2019c).
Figure 4 shows the automatic sentiment analysis we conducted on the national and provincial
components of our dataset, which support what we have found in the qualitative assessment.
Figure 4. Sentiment analysis of national vs. Provincial CPEC media coverage ( 2016 – 23).
Both the sentiment analysis of media coverage and the qualitative discourse analysis reveal
that “pockets of resistance” are significantly more pronounced and dominant in local
coverage. These findings align with our qualitative sentiment analysis, in which we identified
over 179 articles expressing reservations and critiques of CPEC.
This second case study supports our argument that symbolic power is not absorbed uniformly.
Its reception is mediated through uneven geographies of inclusion, exclusion, and
development, with regions like Balochistan offering grounded counter-narratives that resist
the spatial imaginary advanced by CPEC’s central planners. Other provinces, shaped by
diverging local spatial realities and historical trajectories, are, however, more receptive to
China’s narratives, often aligning with them due to stronger integration into national
development agendas or greater material benefits from CPEC projects especially wealthier
urban centers like Lahore and Islamabad. These divergent receptions across space and scale
underscore how symbolic power not only operates discursively but also produces material
effects, reinforcing spatial hierarchies and patterns of uneven development.
This article contributes to the literature on Global China (Franceschini and Loubere 2022 ; Lee
2018 , 2022 ) by presenting a granular and in-depth assessment of the reception of China’s
narratives. While the projection of narratives on China’s part has been extensively studied in
the literature (e.g. Garlick and Qin 202 4; Rolland 2020 ; Yang 2022 ), their reception remains
comparatively less scrutinized. We aimed to fill this gap by deploying the concept of “symbolic
power,” intended as the capacity of a country to propose, legitimize, and naturalize its vision
of the social world and the principles of its construction upon other nations (Bourdieu and
Nice 1977 ; Eagleton-Pierce 2013 ; Threadgold 2020 ; Vangeli 2018 ). We identified three
mechanisms through which symbolic power operates – doxa, misrecognition, and illusio -
presenting a model to analyze the projection and reception of narratives.
Drawing on a multiscalar (national and provincial) and multi-language analysis (Chinese, Urdu,
and English) of an original dataset of 6,133 articles published by the news section of the
Chinese Embassy in Islamabad’s website and in Pakistani national and provincial newspapers,
our analysis revealed important variations in the way in which CPEC is represented within
Pakistan’s media. These variations reveal how symbolic power is received, rearticulated, or
contested across differentiated geographies and center – periphery dynamics. At the national
level, the data showed that China’s narratives are largely accepted and reproduced by
Pakistani media outlets. However, at the provincial level, we observed what we defined as
“pockets of resistance,” which are particularly pronounced in Balochistan but also present in
other provinces, warranting further research. These findings are important as they reveal the
complexity of discursive practices which should not be confined to a top-down view of power.
In addition, even though our analysis is confined to textual representations, it demonstrates
how symbolic power, the mechanism through which, in our case, China attempts to control
and ensure a favorable view of CPEC, coexists with multiple, often contrasting, narratives
(Mehmood and Cousins 2024 AQ10). The media discourse itself highlights concerns about
uneven development, differentiated access, exclusion, and the securitized environments
surrounding CPEC (Zoppolato 2025 ; Safdar 2025), underscoring that narrative struggles are
shaped by how the corridor’s material and spatial effects are experienced across scales and
places. These dynamics point to the uneven geographies of CPEC and, more broadly, of Global
China (Lu and Dwyer 2023 ; Murton 2024 ; Murton and Lord 2020 ; Safdar 2024 ; Woodworth
and Joniak-Lüthi 2020 ) where its benefits, burdens, and symbolic meanings are distributed
unevenly and where differentiated experiences condition how China’s narratives are taken up,
reworked, or contested. In this sense, our findings speak to broader debates on how state-
produced narratives diffuse internationally, showing that symbolic power is mediated, and
often disrupted, by provincial media, local histories, and spatialized inequalities.
Through a detailed empirical examination of how narratives permeate different levels of
Pakistan’s polity, our work brings nuance and granularity to the discursive politics surrounding
one of the BRI’s flagship projects. By showing how the CPEC is talked about, reworked, and
resisted, we highlight the relational nature of symbolic power and demonstrate the value of a
multiscalar, multilingual approach for understanding Global China’s interactions with partner
countries in the Global South. Building on this, future research could apply the framework
developed here in comparative settings, placing cases from both the Global South and Global
North in conversation. Doing so would clarify how state-produced narratives travel across
international contexts, where they encounter friction, and how the politics of reception
generate the uneven geographies through which Global China and other major powers are
understood, contested, and made meaningful.
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